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THE CATHOLIC LAWYER

an inapposite citation from a skeptic.9 Yet
the critics of Holmes, too, have often made
a mistake. Not a little harm has been done
to the natural law estimate of Holmes and
particularly the scholastic natural law estimate by the claim that if one eliminates
God one is driven logically to totalitarianism. The fact is, one is left in the quicksands of two general alternatives, granted
there is no discernible Divine Purpose: the
alternative that every intention is right insofar as it can effectuate itself and the alternative that every intention is right insofar as

it does not conflict with any other intention.
One line of thought leads to the despotisms
of simple power, the other to anarchies of
individualism. The latter was perhaps more
characteristic of Holmes than the former,
although he vacillated between the two.
Scholastic natural law purports to save
us from this hopeless social schizophrenia
built upon agnostic jurisprudence. It is to a
deepened integration of liberty and order,
of right and duty, of getting and giving,
upon a religious basis, that we must look
for the happy results of Mr. Gerhart's work.

Text and Cases by Orvill C. Snyder. The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 1954. Pp. xxxvi, 882. $10.00.
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A.B., LL.B., LL.M., J.U.D., D.Phil. (Oxon.)t

The author of this book, Professor of
Law at the Brooklyn Law School, states that
its purpose "is the examination of the persistent core of meaning of words of large
import, like law, state, sovereignty, legislative, judicial, executive, proof, right, liability, duty, power, privilege, immunity,
property, thing and person, as those words
are used in deciding concrete cases." 1 Implicit in this purpose, however, is a thorGerhart, op. cit. supra note 4, at 126, citing M. D.
Howe: "For those of us, however, who doubt the
cosmic significance of human values, I wonder
whether the rejection of the absolute necessarily
entails such destructive consequences. May not the
value which is merely human have an influence
on law as decisive as that which is gloriously absolute?" But the question is not of the decisiveness
of influence, but of the beneficial and binding nature of the influence. The Communist influence is
human and decisive upon the fate of millions.
tProfessor of Law, Loyola University, New Orleans, La.
' Snyder, Preface to Jurisprudence, Text and Cases
v (1954).

ough exemplification of the analytical school
of jurisprudence, founded by Austin through
inspiration from Hobbes and Bentham, and
later developed by such jurists as Holland,
Salmond, Kocourek, Kelsen and Hohfeld.
Indeed the work is partly dedicated to the
memory of Albert Kocourek from whom
Professor Snyder probably derived his
juridical faith as a result of two courses
in jurisprudence under his instruction at
Northwestern University Law School. 2 He
hails Professor Kocourek as the greatest
analytical jurist of them all, 3 and acknowl-

edges his intellectual indebtedness to the
4
late Walter Wheeler Cook.
The book consists of six parts. A similar
structure appears in each part, save the final
one, namely, chapters in which a short text
by the author, presented from the point of
'Id. at 18, footnote.
8Id. at 9, footnote 29.
4
Id. at 18, footnote.
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view of analytical jurisprudence, is followed
by current cases, generally selected from
courts of last resort, plus other materials,
and lastly by a note containing questions
about the cases, usually without answers,
for classroom discussion. Commendation
is due the author for employing a structure
which distributes case materials in such a
way as to stress function in relation to contemporary legal problems. The limitations
of the book do not stem from any deficiency
of structure or failure to exhaust the possibilities of analysis.
All schools agree that analysis and classification of positive law are essential for any
jurisprudential study. But these alone are
not adequate to avoid sociological sterility
and moral aridness. The inherent deficiency
of the analytical school, and hence of this
book, is its over-preoccupation with positive law, its failure to integrate positive law
with the social and rational sciences, and its
physical power concept of law and the state.
But besides this over-all deficiency, there
are two additional weaknesses, namely, first,
the insufficient and inexact treatment of
theories of natural law, and secondly, what
appear to be statements later in the book,
tending to contradict the basic assumptions
of the analytical school.
Not more than five or six pages have
been devoted to a discussion of natural law 5
in a book of over eight hundred pages. But
even this brief reference is not exact; indeed
it may unwittingly mislead the unwary or
untrained reader, especially a law student.
The natural law concept in its stoic-scholastic form, however, is the oldest in jurisprudence, with a continuous tradition of
thousands of years. Currently, it is one of
the two most dominant and influential in
IId. at pages 6. 7, 25, 26. 62. 71.

the United States; the other is the sociological.
The author has cited Lord Bryce as an
authority for the statement that "the medieval metaphysicians further elaborated on
the naive notion [of natural law] and the
Greek and Roman theories, liberally injecting theology." The reviewer has consulted
the citation,7 but was unable to find where
Lord Bryce had used the word "naive," or
stated that the medieval jurists injected
theology into the concept of natural law.
Actually in this citation, he praised St.
Thomas of Aquinum by writing that he
"introduces a useful distinction which exercised an enduring influence. The Eternal
Law which governs all things is the expression of the Reason of God, the Supreme
Lawgiver. That part of it which is not revealed, but is made known to man by his
own reason, may fitly be called Natural Law,
as being the outcome of human reason,
itself created and directed by the Divine
Reason. Thus the sharing in the Eternal
Law by a rational creature is Natural
Law."
The discovery of this notion by the Greek
philosophers was the result of profound
thinking by gifted intellects. It was not
''naive" in the sense in which that word is
popularly used, with its connotation of
"credulity" or "gullibility." Even though
this word also means "artless," "native" or
"innate," nevertheless it may very well unintentionally communicate an erroneous
meaning.
' Id. at 7, footnote 21.
'The author has referred to Essay 5, of Bryce's
Studies in History and Jurisprudence. Apparently

reference was intended to Essay XI which discusses the law of nature.
' Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Essay X1, 594, 595 (1901).

THE CATHOLIC LAWYER

The medieval metaphysicians did not inject theology into the notion of natural law
but rather theodicy. This is a most important distinction. Theology is the science
of the knowledge of the divine will obtained
by revelation through faith, while theodicy
is the science of that knowledge, known by
reason. The medieval metaphysicians did
combine theodicy with the notion of natural
law in the sense of regarding the latter as
the law of a personal Lawgiver, promulgated in the human intellect, so that in
regard to its more fundamental principles,
it is knowable proximately through the conscience. 9 They showed that while the reason
of man could not attain to a knowledge of
the supernatural law, yet that law was not
unreasonable and did not violate the natural
law, because the supernatural and natural
laws were integrated in the divine will and
intellect. If the statement that the medieval
metaphysicians liberally injected theology
into the concept of natural law means that
they taught that man could come to a
knowledge of a personal Law-maker only
by revelation, and not by reason alone, then
it is totally erroneous.
Not only may the word "naive" be misleading, but also the word "rules" in the
definition of natural law as "a set of enduring and unchangeable rules of conduct,"' 10
which Professor Snyder has given. The natural law is not made up of "rules" of conduct, but rather of principles, ideals or
moral values, which are broader than rules.
It may be defined as "that objective, eternal
and immutable hierarchy of moral values,
which are sources of obligation with regard
to man because they have been so ordained
See Brown, B. F., The Natural Law, The Marriage Bond and Divorce (to be printed in the
March, 1955, issue of the Fordham Law Review).
"0Snyder, op. cit. supra note 1, at 6.

by the Creator of nature."" These values
are more general, therefore, than rules of
conduct, which are derived from the application of principles. The natural law is not
a code of precise rules in the sense of a
moral arithmetic. There were erroneous
theories of natural law which did identify
it with such a code of rules, but the author
of the book has not distinguished these from
the scholastic conception of natural law.
Professor Snyder has written that "in the
era of the French Revolution, there was a
rash of constitution and code making ...
The speed with which many of the constitutions and codes disappeared in the tide of
events brought, in the nineteenth century,
a reaction against the presumptions of the
natural-law theory.' 1 2 The author has failed
to state that this reaction was against subjective, post-Reformational theories of natural law, such as the theory of the supremacy of the individual reason, as followed
by the French Revolution. It was not against
the scholastic concept of natural law, which
in effect was the basis of the theory of the
American Revolution insofar as it was justified by recourse to the authority of absolute
and objective moral values and self-evident
inalienable rights, beyond the just power of
popular majorities or political sovereignty
to destroy.
Again the author has stated that "the
natural law theory . . . seems to be susceptible of sustaining communism .... '13 It
is obvious that a notion of objective natural
law based on right reason as understood by
a scholastic jurist could never be susceptible
of doing this because the ideals of communism are fundamentally opposed to nat01

Brown, B. F., op. cit. supra note 9.

10 Snyder,

op. cit. supra note 1. at 7. 8.

1Id. at 15, footnote 49.
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ural law. Here Professor Snyder has not
made clear which theory of natural law is
meant, with resulting ambiguity which may
lead some readers to believe that his statement refers to every possible type of natural
law thinking.
The scholastic notion of natural law is
basically concerned with the justice and
morality of positive law, not with the moral
goodness or badness of those who make the
law. Hence the author's statement that "any
theory which sinks into the minds of men
the thought of what positive law ought to
be lodges there acceptance of who ought
to make and enforce that law . .. 14 refers
only to a subjective conception of natural
law. According to the scholastic idea, positive law made in contravention of the natural law is to be condemned as unjust,
whether the law-maker was morally good
or bad. But it does not necessarily follow
that the law-maker in such a case is to be
personally condemned. If he acted in good
faith and was in invincible error after adequate investigation, then he was not personally culpable. Hence Professor Snyder's
conclusion that "it would have been surprising indeed, if variations of the natural
law theory had not appeared,"' 5 because
there is no distinction between the morality
of the positive law and that of its maker,
does not relate to the scholastic position.
According to the concept of objective
natural law, the personal condemnation of
the act of the law-maker in making the law
does not render a positive law unjust, but
rather the impersonal, non-psychological
conflict between the positive law and the
natural law.
The second weakness of the book accord1, Id. at 7, footnote 23.
15Ibid.

ing to scholastic jurisprudence results from
the unsuccessful effort to escape from the
inexorable conclusion to which the analytical school leads, namely, that might makes
right. This school can not offer any ideal or
theory of moral right to interpose as an
authority against the tyrannical and despotic will of a dictator, an oligarchy, or the
people themselves. A power concept of law
and of all that pertains thereto, such as justice, the judicial process, and sovereignty,
is presented throughout the book, but on a
few pages, 16 the author makes reference to
the ideal of freedom and accepted notions
of justice. This reference is either a contradiction or is juridically irrelevant.
The power concept of law may be seen
in the definition that it is "the aggregate of
those rules and principles of conduct which
the governing power in a community recognizes as those which it will enforce or sanction."117 Law is regarded as the command
of the sovereign. The command arises from
the sanction. If there is no sanction, there
is no command and hence no law."' Only
the threatened evil of physical force is
sanction.' 9
Complementing this power notion of law
is the amoral approach. The problem of the
moral duty of obedience is concealed by the
definition of law as a sequence of events.
"If one occurrence, called the condition,
takes place, another occurrence, called the
consequence, follows." 2 0 Kinds of law differ
only in regard to "how the condition and
the consequence are connected." 21
'Id. at 537, 605.
Id. at 72, 73.

Is
ld. at 222 et seq.
id. at 223, 224.
20Id. at 71.
21Ibid.
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The author extends the power concept
from law to justice. Thus he states that "a
theory of justice ends as a theory of sovereignty and a theory of sovereignty as a
theory of justice." '22 Justice and sovereignty
are interchangeable, therefore, as are legal23
ity and justice.
A power notion is also extended to the
judicial process by Professor Snyder. He
maintains that judges are free to select
whatever they like from such so-called
source material as "customs, moral principles, economic, political, and social
facts,"'24 as long as they have the legal
power to do so, with ultimate reference to
the Constitution, which in turn is subject
to no moral criterion but only the authority
of force.2 5 Even the doctrine of judicial
supremacy of the Supreme Court of the
United States is treated as a concept of
power, limited in turn by the power of
electoral pressure brought to bear on the
2
other branches of the government. "
That the author has based his theory of
the Constitution and of sovereignty on force
is evident from his statement that the sovereign is "limited by that law of nature which
is the stubborness of mankind that stops
even an oriental despot and by such laws
of nature as that water does not run uphill." '27 Thus he reduces the law of nature
to the physically compulsive, and accepts
the fact of the human jungle.
But after this presentation of the power
notion of law, justice, the judicial process,
Id. at 143.
-Id. at 16.
Id. at 220.
22

2

2.

Id. at 136 et seq.
'21
d. at 141.
21 Id. at 108.
2.
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and sovereignty, the author states, on page
537, that the ideal of our legal system is
"that the public force be used to promote
and protect the maximum of individual
freedom possible in a complex society. With
us, this is the first value. . . ." Again, on
page 605, he writes "if they [the judges]
prove steadfast to those 'accepted notions
of justice,' 'fused in the whole nature of our
judicial process' and 'deeply rooted in the
compelling traditions of the legal profession,' they will not err." Moreover, he states
on page 520 that "laws may be made to
protect against injuries to and to promote
the health, safety, morals, convenience, and
general welfare of the community and its
members."
These statements are either contradictions of what appears in other parts of the
book, or else they are juridically meaningless. Law may or may not be a method of
protecting freedom and the common good
according to the command of the sovereign.
But those who hold the power concept of
law must agree that whatever the sovereign
makes law do as a means to an end is what
law ought to do.
It is to be hoped that Professor Snyder
in his next edition will change the orientation of this book. Adoption of a type of
legal philosophy, which will provide perspective for the legal order and place it
under a duty to be responsive to those
permanent values which reason and experience require in all social sciences, would
greatly enhance the usefulness of his contribution. It is regrettable that a book which
contains so much technically valuable material and which represents an enormous
amount of research and careful planning
should be handicapped by the strait-jacket
of the analytical school.

